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Rights  in  mind:  thinking d if ferent ly  about  dementia  and d isabi l i ty  
 
Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to argue for the utility of a relational model of disability, as a way of 
conceptualizing dementia.  We explore whether dementia should be considered 
as a disability, and whether people with dementia might consider themselves as 
disabled people. We review examples of, and issues raised by, the political activism of 
people with dementia. We consider how language constructs dementia negatively. We 
discuss how the environment influences the experience of dementia.   In conclusion, we show 
that a relational model of dementia lays the basis for a human rights approach to the 
condition, based on collaborative partnerships between people with dementia and people 
from other disability communities. 
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Introduction 
Dementia and disability seem like planets spinning on different axes, their inhabitants 
aware of each other’s existence but apparently unable to communicate (Mittler 2016a). 
There is a perception in the disability world that dementia is solely a health responsibility. 
People with dementia do not necessarily think of themselves as disabled.  But the planets are 
aligning. Dementia Alliance International - all of whose members have a medical diagnosis - 
demanded access to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities at the WHO’s 
First Ministerial Conference on Dementia (WHO 2015). A strong human-rights based 
resolution proposed by Alzheimer’s Disease International was unanimously approved and 
later incorporated into the Concluding Call for Action by WHO Director General, Dr 
Margaret Chan.   
 
Work is now in progress to make a reality of that demand  (Dementia Alliance International 
(2016).   Several recent interventions have proposed adopting a social model approach to 
dementia, borrowing from innovations in disability studies (JRF 2015, MHF 2015).  A social 
model approach distinguishes between the illness/impairment, and the oppression or 
exclusion that people with the illness/impairment experience.  A social model would focus on 
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the social barriers faced by people with illnesses and impairments.  However, this classic 
social model approach does not fully account for the complexity of the disability experience 
(Shakespeare 2006), and so we will argue that it cannot do the required job in terms of 
dementia.   Our suggestion in this paper is that a more innovative approach to dementia is 
required.  This approach must give appropriate weight both to the condition itself, and to the 
social relations within which people with the condition, and their families, live.   Dementia, 
like disability in general, is a multi-dimensional phenomenon, and requires a response that 
addresses different aspects, including clinical, psychological, social, and political. 
 
We suggest that regarding dementia as a disability could be beneficial for people living with 
dementia. As noted by Angus and Bowen-Osborne (2014): 
 
“Disability and illness narratives can provide us with the opportunity to circumvent a 
reliance on a description of the physical impairment and expose attitudes and practices 
imposed upon a person…” 
 
We are also interested in whether categorizing dementia as a disability may help us to 
explore some of the ways that barriers and discourses shape experiences of the 
condition. Perhaps most importantly, we hypothesize that seeing dementia as a 
disability could place people with dementia, as self-advocates, at the centre of their own 
stories, and help provide an enabling identity. 
 
 
Dementia as disability 
We need to start by asking whether or not dementia is a disability (or impairment, to 
use social model language, see Oliver 1990). This is different from the question of whether 
people with dementia consider themselves disabled. The first question can be answered more 
or less objectively, the second question is subjective, depending on the attitudes, values 
and experiences of individual people with dementia themselves. 
 
The WHO International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health defines 
disability as “an umbrella term for impairments, activity limitations and participation 
restrictions” (WHO, 2002, 2), referring to the negative aspects of the interaction between an 
individual with a health condition and that individual’s contextual factors (environmental and 
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personal factors): 
 
According to Article 1 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
(CRPD): 
 
“Persons with disabilities include those who have long-term physical, mental, 
intellectual or sensory impairments which in interaction with various barriers may 
hinder their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others.” 
 
In UK law, the Equality Act 2010 states that a person (P) has a disability if: 
(a) P has a physical or mental impairment, and 
(b) the impairment has a substantial and long-term adverse effect on P's ability to 
carry out normal day-to-day activities. 
 
In general terms, the dementia syndrome is characterized by progressive decline in cognition 
of sufficient severity to interfere with activities of daily living (Knopman et al., 2001). 
Therefore, dementia may be seen as having the features of a disability, in the same way as 
with other degenerative conditions such as Huntington’s disease, multiple sclerosis or 
Parkinson’s disease. The fact that a specific disease or syndrome – such as Alzheimer’s – is 
hard to diagnose and define does not negate this. Other health conditions, such as 
schizophrenia or autism, are equally complex, and yet it is clear to most observers that they 
can be usefully regarded as disabilities because  they are associated with difficulties in 
functioning.  Epidemiologists generally categorise dementia among the wider category of 
disabilities (ADI and WHO 2012, 8;  Stephan and Brayne, 2010:14; WHO 2003).  So we 
would argue, that from semantic, epidemiological and legal perspectives, dementia is a 
disability. 
 
The answer to the second question, concerning whether people with dementia think of 
themselves as disabled, will always be provisional. As with the co-author of this paper, 
some people living with early-stage dementia have strongly articulated a disability 
identification; some are reluctant to do so; others are silent (Whitman 2015). Many will 
reject what they may perceive as another stigmatising label.  
 
However, this is not very different from people with other impairments. A study carried out 
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for the Department for Work and Pensions found that 52% of people with rights under the 
Disability Discrimination Act did not identify as disabled (DWP 2002). Many people with 
learning difficulties are reluctant to adopt the label disabled, as are many Deaf people 
(Shakespeare 2006). Older people, who make up around half of all disabled people, can 
view their functional deficits as part of normal ageing, and hence are less likely to identify as 
disabled (Kelley-Moore et al 2006). We can anticipate that people with dementia will also 
vary in their willingness to identify as disabled. But like other groups, they can still use the 
UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) as a tool to advance their 
rights. 
 
Certainly, people with dementia are not seen by the general public, professionals or by other 
disabled people as part of the disability rights community. The dementia community has 
never been part of the disability movement, and did not join forces with the powerful 
coalition of disabled people’s organisations which campaigned for the Convention (Sabatello 
and Schulze 2014). This is the paradox that we are seeking to address in this paper.  
 
Dementia is a decrement in functioning (WHO 2001), but the corollary that people with 
dementia are disabled is harder to accept. If people with dementia are a specific group, then 
they have rights and an ability to articulate their own needs (Taylor 2007, Swaffer 2016). 
This was clearly articulated by Marshall some 16 years ago (as noted by Gilliard et al, 2005: 
576) arguing for the positive benefits of regarding dementia as a disability. We recognise the 
danger of subsuming all people with dementia (who are innately diverse and who are affected 
differently) into one group, let alone into the wider disability community. But forming a 
unitary movement was no less challenging for people with mental health conditions 
(Wallcraft and Bryant 2003). 
 
More than a medical condition 
The banner under which other disability communities have united is opposition to 
inappropriate medicalization.  The point about the social model of disability is that it 
distinguishes between the health condition, on the one foot, and the social experience of 
exclusion, on the other.  However, dementia still remains trapped within the dominant 
medical discourse. 
 
Since the late 1990s, there has been a slow but steady movement away from the 
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tendency to view dementia solely within a medical framework (Ballenger, 2006, Basting, 
2009, Killick, 2013, Kitwood, 1997, Sabat, 2014). Kitwood’s notion (1990) of “malignant 
social psychology” was perhaps the seminal conceptualization provoking a reconsideration of 
the role of social environment for people with dementia. Reliance on a solely medical 
framework has been increasingly criticised for maintaining the exclusion and passive 
dependency of people with dementia: 
 
‘It is important …. to identify correctly what constitutes a symptom of neuropathology as 
opposed to an appropriate emotional reaction to an extremely undesirable situation or 
to dysfunctional social treatment.’ (Sabat, 2008:71).  In both research and policy, an 
increased understanding of the ways in which social dimensions can be influential (positively 
and negatively) has helped re-focus dementia research on the person, rather than solely the 
illness (Gilliard et al 2005).  
 
Practice has been slower to change. In 2015, the OECD stated that dementia receives “the 
worst quality of care in the developed world” (OECD 2015). But there is an increasing focus 
on improving quality of life for people with dementia (Gross, Danilova et al. 2013), including 
the social conditions in which people live, whether in care homes or in the community (Dodd 
and Bush 2013). The importance of investigating ‘nonpharmacologic tools’ has also been 
widely embraced across the US (Kaldy 2013). 
 
Pioneering work by researchers and practitioners has contributed to the understanding 
that although Alzheimer’s and other dementias may be incurable at present, they are 
conditions that can be treated. While antipsychotics may work for some people, treatment 
always includes more than drugs and requires attention to the social environment in which 
people with dementia live (Kitwood 1997, Sabat 2001, Zeisel 2009, Killick 2013). WHO 
promotes a model of Healthy Ageing, which takes the environment into account, not just 
intrinsic capacity (WHO 2016). 
 
Nevertheless, medicalisation still predominates. This is partly a product of biomedical 
models of illness that can be traced back to the Enlightenment (Bond, 2001). One 
consequence of the medicalization of dementia is the way in which disease is seen as the 
loss of ‘normality’ with the associated labelling of people with dementia as ‘victims’ or 
‘sufferers’ (Bond 2001: 45). An important influence is the financial dominance of 
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pharmaceutical companies, which are primarily concerned with the huge market in 
drugs for these conditions (Moynihan and Cassels, 2006).  The tendency to over-medicalise 
dementia, and people with dementia, has obscured the importance of social conditions that 
contribute to disabling people with the condition. 
 
People with dementia are activists too 
One factor that may account for the continued over-medicalisation is the relatively recent 
emergence of dementia activism. Political action by people with mental health problems, 
physical impairments and those affected by HIV/AIDS (Wallcraft and Bryant 2003, 
Campbell and Oliver 1996, Hughes 2009) has redefined these issues.  Unlike the disability 
movement, whose sustained advocacy led to the UN Convention, (Mittler 2016b) those with 
dementia have only recently started to unite and attempt to influence policy. As noted by 
Bartlett: 
 
“Dementia activism is a newly emergent phenomenon ….. With few exceptions, activism 
by people with dementia has not been the prime focus of research.” (Bartlett 2014a, 
624). 
 
The novelty of dementia activism reflects the assumption that the rapid progression of 
the illness means that individuals do not have the capacity to make speeches or 
campaign. The trend for earlier diagnoses, and the work of groups such as the 
Scottish Dementia Working Group and the Dementia Engagement and 
Empowerment Project (DEEP 2016) have demonstrated how those with dementia can 
effectively unite and advocate.  
 
At the international level, Dementia Alliance International (www.infodai.org ) has led the 
campaign for access to CRPD. For example, it has recently succeeded in persuading 
Alzheimer’s Disease International to adopt a human-rights-based policy which includes 
making full use of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and has 
submitted its own report to a UN General Day of Discussion on Independent Living and 
Participation in the Community (Mittler 2016c). DAI has facilitated exchange and discussion 
among people with dementia.  For example, a persistent theme raised in DAI writings and 
blogs is the ‘prescribed disengagement’ (Swaffer 2016) that accompanies diagnosis, with 
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advice to the patient to stop work, hand in their driving license and prepare for an early death. 
Another is the social isolation that follows disclosure of diagnosis when friends, 
neighbours and family members deliberately avoid meeting them (Taylor 2009). 
 
The human rights based approach (HRBA) is based on participation of people with lived 
experience, as with the disability rights movement’s motto ‘nothing about us without 
us’.  Yet there is a shocking lack of consultation with people with dementia throughout 
much of dementia care (Gilliard et al, 2005).  
 
Self-advocacy is not straightforward in the case of dementia. Only those with mild to 
moderate impairment are able to advocate for themselves or their peers, even with support 
(Karlsson et al 2014).  In addition, dementia activism can be exhausting (Bartlett 2014b).   
The short lifespan of the publication ‘The Voices of Dementia”, a US journal of and by 
individuals living with the symptoms of dementia, shows that continuity can be precarious. 
 
Terry Pratchett is a pertinent example of one well known UK dementia activist. He was 
articulate about the effects of dementia, vociferous about the need for further funding 
and better understanding about living well with the ‘embuggeration’ that is dementia: 
 
“I regarded finding I had a form of Alzheimer’s as an insult, and I decided to do my best 
to marshal any kind of forces that I could against this wretched disease.” (Pratchett 
2015) 
 
Yet Pratchett was only able to be an activist for eight years. Nevertheless, Pratchett lived 
longer with dementia than average. The brief life-span of those with dementia (it has been 
estimated that on average men live for 4.1 years and women live for 4.6 years following 
onset of dementia, (Xie, Brayne & Matthews, 2008)), makes it difficult for long-term change 
to be achieved.  As Bartlett (2014a) has convincingly outlined, ‘temporality’ is a distinctive 
feature of dementia activism. This is partly because of the degenerative nature of the illness, 
but also because the temporal structure of the condition is so perplexing.  Campaigning 
within more established disability rights networks may help dementia activism have a 
sustained impact.  Echoing the movement of people with learning difficulties, where 
supporters and advocates add weight to the voice of lived experience, is another approach 
(Roberts et al 2012). 
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Towards a relational model of dementia 
Interest in the social conditions that affect dementia reflects the burgeoning of 
community-based initiatives for people living with a dementia. There has been a 
general movement away from formal spaces designated for care and support toward a 
more diffuse range of community-based spaces that are both accessible to and 
supportive of people with dementia. In this context the policy-driven notion of Dementia 
Friendly Communities (Prime Minister’s Challenge on Dementia 2012) and campaigns 
such as ‘Dementia Friends’ might be understood as reflecting this effort to re-think both 
the place of care and the ascription of responsibility to provide care and support. 
So far, social responses to dementia have centered on the need for awareness. In some 
ways, this echoes the early stages of disability politics. Yet “awareness” and “friends” are 
rather weak concepts. We argue that what is required is a stronger response, an equalities-
based approach, that recognizes that people with dementia are a minority group in society, 
who are poorly served in many environments, and who consequently face exclusion, 
even oppression. 
 
In several recent papers (Mental Health Foundation 2015, Thomas and Milligan 2015), 
attempts have been made to outline a social model of dementia. There is much sense in 
these papers, and they are to be welcomed. They are genuinely committed to fresh 
thinking about the experience and response to dementia, and to the empowerment of 
people who live with this condition. However, at the same time, we believe they miss 
opportunities to outline how a social relational approach can be applied to dementia, 
because their understanding of disability remains crude. 
 
The original Union of Physically Impaired Against Segregation (UPIAS) (1976) model of 
disability, labelled the social model and elaborated by Michael Oliver (1990), distinguishes 
between impairment (medical) and disability (social), and focuses on social barriers and 
oppression. It has been criticized for reducing the complexity of disability to crude 
environmental determinism, and for ignoring the personal experiences of those living with 
illness and impairment (Morris 1991, Shakespeare 2006). Because the social model was 
developed to account for the experience of people with static physical impairments, it fails 
adequately to contextualise impairments which are associated with pain; with limitation; with 
frailty; and with degeneration.  Despite the best efforts of Carol Thomas (1999, 2007), the 
 9 
social model approach has also failed to make adequate space for psychological issues.  
Dementia highlights again how the social model has are never been very good at 
conceptualizing cognitive impairments (Chappell 1998) or mental health conditions 
(Beresford 2012). 
 
How do attitudes, environments, and policies make life harder for people with dementia (and 
their families)? How can inclusion be achieved? The Mental Health Foundation paper states 
this social model aim clearly: 
 
“A social model approach argues that people with dementia must be viewed as a 
legitimate part of mainstream society, living in communities as equal citizens with their 
value recognized and respected” (MHF 2015, 21). 
 
However, it does not fully engage with the implications of this position.  ‘Dementia 
Friendly Communities’ are not enough. People with dementia have lived independently 
and been fully participating members of their community all their lives but encounter 
deep-rooted and systemic attitudinal and societal obstacles to continuing to do so 
following diagnosis.  Even a phrase like ‘dementia friendly’, while apparently positive, could 
be considered patronizing and inappropriate. The implication is that the solution to the 
dementia problem is for people without dementia to be kind and welcoming of people with 
dementia. But if the problem includes socially-imposed barriers, devaluing and even human 
rights violations, then the term ‘friendly’ might be judged an inappropriate response. which 
we would not use for other excluded groups. As Kate Swaffer has said, we might ask instead 
for ‘Dementia Enabling Communities’. Long-term disability activist Ian Popperwell writes in 
his blog: 
 
“Subtle courtesies and acts of kindness can make all the difference to how any of us 
experience our worlds, but for me there is an ugly flavour of charitable patronage when 
the term ‘friendliness’ is used instead of the carefully tried and tested words that speak 
much more of rights, dignity, consistency and thoughtfulness.” (Popperwell 2014). 
 
A more inclusive social model approach would ask: do mainstream services (health, 
transport, housing) place barriers in the way of people with dementia? Do people receive 
equal treatment? Is there ‘reasonable adjustment’ to the needs of people with dementia? For 
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example, people with dementia do not have their non-dementia health needs adequately dealt 
with by the health service (see Alzheimer’s Society report ‘Fix Dementia Care’ 2016). This 
has also been found to be the case for people with learning disabilities and people with 
mental health conditions (e.g. Melville et al 2006). In response, doctors and receptionists and 
others would need to change their ways of working to ensure that people with dementia get 
screened for cancer, or get their flu immunization, or get referred for investigations when 
they present with other symptoms, or get treated well in hospitals. 
 
Moreover, a universal design philosophy, with an emphasis on barrier removal in 
physical environments and also in information provision, would provide an overall 
context for the many ongoing efforts to create more inclusive environments for people 
with dementia. However, going further than universal design, it would be desirable to 
provide more supportive responses to ensure that people with dementia feel welcome 
and included (Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2009). There is evidence that unsupportive 
environments can contribute to anxiety and agitation for people with dementia 
(Chaudhury & Cooke, 2014:144). One relevant initiative is the Personal Assistant – 
Dementia (PAD) role which operates in Walsall. Individuals provide information, 
support, and signposting to people in the first three months after diagnosis. 
 
Due to marketisation, increasing consumer choice and our growing reliance on online 
interactions, the world has arguably become more confusing for everyone, and 
particularly for people with dementia as they seek to engage with services in the public 
and private sector. For example, technologies like mobile phones and services such as 
banking are very complex, demanding passwords and interactions that may exclude or 
disable people with dementia (Nygard and Starkhammar 2007, Batchelor et al 2012). 
Yet technology could and should enable people with dementia (Lauriks et al 2007, 
Wherton and Monk 2008). For example, in response to this socially engendered 
disabling, the simple-to-use Raku phone has been developed in Japan. 
 
In the classic case of mobility impairments, the disabling environment is very obvious 
(e.g. lack of ramps and accessible bathrooms) and the solutions are clear. If an 
environment is rendered accessible, and discrimination is effectively countered through 
education or legislation, then people who use wheelchairs can participate on an equal 
basis with others. The solutions are more complex for someone who lacks 
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or is losing cognitive ability’;  whose fluctuating mental health condition means that for days 
at a time, s/he is unable to get out of bed or interact with others at work;  or a person on the 
autistic spectrum  who experiences neurodiversity. Full equality for people with dementia 
may be elusive, but creatively inclusive responses are long overdue. 
 
A statement such as “The medical model maintains oppression, exclusive and passive 
dependency of the person” (MHF 2015, 14) is a simplification of a very complex process 
whereby a person with dementia ends up being treated as dependent and denied a voice. 
Perhaps a better extrapolation of what happens when someone has dementia is that she is 
viewed in terms of her inabilities, whether these are cognitive, relational or functional, and in 
comparison to an expected norm of personhood. Her strengths become invisible. Her 
emotional and social bonds stand for nothing. Her disease and difficulties become her 
defining features. On top of her diagnosis, a heavy weight of negative cultural 
representation (Peel 2014, Zeilig 2014) clouds the collective vision of this person living 
with dementia. 
 
A relational disability model of dementia would take an adequate and nuanced approach to 
dementia whereby there was both medical research into deficits and treatments, and action to 
remove social, attitudinal and architectural barriers. Similarly, empowering people with 
dementia as far as possible is clearly an important goal, but policy should also recognize that 
people with dementia will require support and protection when their disease makes it 
impossible for them to be active.  The Mental Health Foundation paper refers to this 
approach which ‘gives greater credence to the personal experience of having a disability, in 
conjunction with the political and social contexts’ (MHF 2015, 15). This is seen as an 
appropriate approach, given that “the majority of people with dementia frame dementia as an 
illness or disease” and that the “disabling factor may be intrinsic to the condition”. The 
author(s) conclude by saying “the social model needs to take account not only of the external 
barriers, but also of the social and psychological obstacles that exclude or restrict full 
participation in society” (MHF 2015, 15). 
 
This approach would look at how both the health condition itself, and the social responses to 
it, generate the disability (Shakespeare 2006). Such an approach could be conceived in terms 
of the International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health (ICF) (WHO 2001), 
where disability arises from the interaction of a health condition with environmental factors 
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and personal factors. Alternatively, various scholars have proposed a critical realist approach 
to disability (Dannermark and Gellerstedt 2004, Shakespeare 2006), entailing a laminated 
model. This refers to the different levels – the biological, the psychological, the 
environmental, the social, the legal – which interact to produce the experience of disability. 
We believe this could offer a more adequate understanding of the complexity of dementia. 
 
Dementia as a human rights issue 
The corollary of regarding dementia as a form of disability, and articulating either a social or 
relational disability model of dementia, is that dementia should be regarded as a human rights 
issue.   At the domestic UK level, this means the Equality Act, and at the international level 
the equivalent is the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), which 
the UK ratified in 2009. As the Mental Health Foundation (2015), Neil Crowther (2016), 
Peter Mittler (2016a, 2016b) and others have argued, it is long overdue for the CRPD to be 
applied to, and used by, the dementia community.   It is frequently said that the CRPD uses a 
social model of disability. Article 1 talks about the interaction of impairments with various 
barriers. Rather than a traditional social model, this would be better interpreted as endorsing 
the relational approach discussed above. In other words, both the impairment and the barriers, 
interacting together, hinder full and effective participation in society.  
 
The CRPD offers benefits to people diagnosed with dementia, in particular Article 12, which 
states that people with disabilities have legal capacity on an equal basis with others. 
Status-based approaches to capacity are discriminatory: rather than taking away someone’s 
driving license when they are diagnosed, it should depend on independent assessment of 
capacity to drive, i.e. a functional approach to capacity. Article 12 promotes supported, rather 
than substitute, decision making, which could be a beneficial process in dementia. Rather 
than automatic guardianship as soon as someone shows signs of cognitive impairment, the 
principle of “supported decision making” entails working with the individual to ascertain 
their will and preference.  Yet dementia also challenges Article 12. The Essex Autonomy 
Project (2014) and many psychiatrists, philosophers and lawyers (e.g. Freeman et al 2015, 
Dawson 2015) have found the wording and implications of Article 12 and its radical 
interpretations very hard to elucidate or implement practically. Nuffield Council on Bioethics 
(2009) and others have stressed instead “joint decision-making” with trusted family or 
friends. 
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A second area in which dementia – and other complex conditions – challenges the CRPD 
concerns the role of the family and other informal carers of people with dementia. Carers also 
share the lived experience of dementia. Most importantly, they provide the vast majority of 
support and assistance for people living with dementia (Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2009). 
Family members are largely absent from the CRPD, aside from an explicit mention in the 
Preamble and implicitly in in Article 23, ‘Respect for home and family’. The absence of 
family members or other third parties reminds us that a human rights approach is essentially 
individualistic. An individual makes a claim because their rights are violated. Yet people live 
their lives relationally. In every state, including the wealthiest, informal carers provide the 
majority of assistance (WHO 2011). To the extent that it fails to engage with the experiences 
of people with dementia – or indeed profound intellectual disabilities -  the Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities promotes the liberal individualist fiction, rather than the 
complex, messy, interdependent reality of life. 
 
 
Conclusion 
Bringing dementia within the disability rights mainstream is not easy. The usual language of 
disability rights is hard to apply. What would “Dementia Pride” mean, for example?  There 
may be no world in which it would be easy to have dementia (or Motor Neurone Disease or 
Parkinson’s), but there should be a world in which it is possible to live better with these 
conditions. Hence the emphasis on Living Well with Dementia (Swaffer 2016) or Living 
Beyond Dementia.  
 
As with other areas of disability politics, there is a danger of a Pollyanna-ish approach, which 
overlooks the unpleasant and difficult aspects of having an illness or impairment (Carel 
2008).  That is why taking dementia seriously means reconfiguring our approaches to 
disability as a whole.  The condition of dementia challenges the disability community to 
remember how impairments can impact daily living, and how emotionality is important. It 
also reminds us how humans can communicate and connect without language, and that we 
are more than our memories (Basting 2009, Banner 2014).    As noted by the activist Richard 
Taylor: 
 
“It is true that I am fundamentally different from you. I am different in ways I can't 
express and you can't fully perceive or understand. Our brains are different. But I am 
 14 
still a complete human being”. (Taylor, 2011) 
 
Here Taylor asserts both his status as ‘different’ and also his fundamental completeness 
and thus similarity to all human beings.  Dementia highlights the diversity of disability. We 
often speak as if there is one shared disability experience. We talk of disabled people, which 
implies a unity. Yet there are many experiences. Impairments and illness differ in the way 
they affect people, and the extent to which they affect people. There is a particular distinction 
between impairments that are physical or sensory, and those that have a cognitive dimension: 
people with learning difficulties and people with mental illness are more excluded. We 
argue that people with dementia are among the most excluded, by virtue of the loss of 
experience and relationships which they have enjoyed throughout their lives. 
 
The work of Killick (2014), Hughes (2013), Sabat (2008) attests to the possibility that people 
with dementia can maintain reciprocal relationships, even at fairly advanced stages of the 
illness, and confirm the persistence of relationality. This sense of ‘being with others’ (a 
concept borrowed from the philosopher Heidegger), the cultural and social exchange and 
sharing that continues for people with dementia, is perhaps the strongest indication that 
personhood and identity are not destroyed by dementia. If we are beginning to understand the 
voice that people with dementia retain, and the possibilities for a more expanded  
understanding of personhood, then we open the doors to a more powerful articulation of the 
rights of people with dementia and thus their ability to retain their humanity to the end of 
their lives. 
 
We have argued here that it is vital to situate the individual experience of dementia in the 
broader social context. We also need to articulate a human rights perspective in which self-
advocacy is core. We need to expand our ideas about social models and about human rights 
in order to incorporate the experience of all human beings, including people living with 
dementia. We are embarking on a project of cultural transformation (Scully 2012, 72). 
 
Seeing dementia as a disability, within whatever version of the social or laminated model you 
choose, might be very helpful for people with this condition. But it is unclear at the moment 
how it could be operationalised. We lack sufficient consistent work inclusive of people with 
dementia, and activism of people with dementia themselves over a period of time. This paper 
has been a collaboration between a disabled person, a person with a mental health condition, 
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and a person living with dementia. Our combined experiences of living with disability has 
added depth to our understanding, both at the level of lived experience and intellectual 
endeavour. The politics of dementia demands that people with and without the condition 
work together. Understanding the experience of dementia means incorporating the 
psychological and the cultural and the structural with the medical. This is a complex 
enterprise. 
 
As a society, if we can assimilate and acknowledge all that dementia implies, and the 
diverse ways in which people with dementia want to live, then we will also have a more 
profound understanding of life, and all that it entails – not just decay, loss, transience 
and difficulty, but also joy, love and friendship. The benefits will be felt not just by those 
living with dementia, but by people living with disability – and indeed, everyone. 
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